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The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media

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Academic writing on 'terrorism' and the availability to the mainstream media and policy-makers of terror 'experts' have increased exponentially since 11 September 2001. This paper examines the rise of terror expertise and its use in one particular public arena – the mainstream news media. Using a combination of citation analysis and media analysis, the paper presents a ranking of the most influential terror experts in the mainstream news media in the Anglophone world. It is shown how what has been called an 'invisible college' of experts operates as a nexus of interests connecting academia with military, intelligence and government agencies, with the security industry and the media. The paper then takes a small number of case studies of some of the most prominent experts who exemplify the dominant trend in the field and examines the networks in which they are embedded. The last part of the paper uses the data generated to re-examine theories of 'terrorism' and the media, of 'propaganda' and 'terrorism', and of 'source–media' relations. It is suggested that the study of terror experts shows the need to study and theorise the media in a wider context by focusing on the relations between media content and production processes and wider formations of power. In so doing, the paper attempts to connect studies of media and terrorism to wider studies of terror and political violence.

Keywords: terrorism expertise; academia; news media; think-tanks; ideology; military–industrial complex

Introduction

Terrorism experts are ubiquitous in mainstream media coverage of political violence. They provide commentary and analysis and are used as a resource especially to fill news space in the absence of hard information. But before the 1970s, there were very few academics who studied 'terrorism'. War, revolution, political violence, social movements, and counterinsurgency were all topics of some note in the social sciences – but not terrorism. Of course, 'terrorism studies' is not sharply divorced from such previous work. It emerges as an academic specialism from these topics and in particular from the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, itself only forged in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to decolonisation and the rise of the United States as a global superpower (Maechling 1988, Schlesinger 1978). The ideas prominent in orthodox terrorism studies, and often the theorists themselves, have strong roots in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice (Klare 1988, McClintock 1992). Orthodox terrorism experts are, in other words, ideologically committed and practically engaged in

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supporting Western state power. Of course, the defenders of the orthodoxy deny this characterisation of their craft (Horgan and Boyle 2008), but as we will show, it is hard to draw any evidentially based alternative conclusion.

This paper reports the first findings of a study of the phenomenon of terrorism expertise.[1] It focuses in particular on the relationship between the experts and the mainstream media rather than on their relations with policy processes, the private sector, think-tanks and other private institutes, the legal system, or directly with government, police or armed groups. These will be the subjects of later work. Our analysis of the media is largely quantitative and is not intended to rehearse arguments about how and why the patterns that emerge exist. Rather, we are interested here in questions about the relative status of the experts featured in the media, as compared with other measures of their expertise such as citation or publication analysis.

We see terrorism knowledge not as some ideologically neutral expertise on a natural phenomenon, but as being created to reflect the priorities and values of certain social interests. The very existence of 'terrorism experts' promotes the idea that the surface similarities between acts of violence provide a solid foundation for generalisations about 'terrorism', whatever the political or social context. We use the term 'terrorologist' to designate those writers whose main work is focused explicitly on 'terrorism', as opposed to those active in area studies or in examining some other dimension or macro levels in which 'terrorism' might play a part (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989).

The paper is divided into five sections: first, an account of the rise of terrorism expertise; second, an outline of the theoretical underpinning of our analysis; third, an account of the dominance of the leading terror experts as sources for the media. This analysis is quantitative and includes a comprehensive 7-year-long database of 'major world newspapers' coverage of terrorism (in English) which is much greater than those traditionally used in samples of media coverage. This shows the very marked dominance of orthodox and state and corporate linked experts in mainstream media coverage. Fourth, we examine four cases of terror experts who are at the core of what we argue is an 'invisible college' of terrorism experts and commentators. Fifth, we present an analysis of some key elements of the network. Lastly, we conclude by summarising the findings on the role of the terror experts.

The rise of terror expertise

Experts specifically on 'terrorism' first emerged during the early 1970s. The number of academic articles on terrorism increased greatly during the course of that decade, reaching a peak in 1978 (Figure 1).[2] The attention given the topic in the media followed a similar pattern. During the 1960s press articles on terrorism appear to have been less numerous than in the 1950s, whilst during the 1970s coverage increased roughly fourfold (Figure 2).[3] *The Times* and *The Sunday Times* featured 242 articles mentioning terrorism during 1970, and 908 articles during 1978; whilst *The Guardian* and *The Observer* featured 319 articles in 1970 and as many as 1342 in 1978.

A handful of key experts emerged during this period who remain influential – and in some cases active – today. David Rapoport, Martha Crenshaw, Brian Jenkins and Paul Wilkinson were important early figures, as were Yonah Alexander, Walter Laqueur and Ariel Merari, who emerged later that decade (Reid 1992). As well as producing academic studies, these experts advised Western governments on counterinsurgency operations, policing and legislating against 'subversives'. Many were affiliated to rightwing think-tanks, the military, or the private security sector. Brian Jenkins, a US Army veteran, was

Figure 1.   Articles on 'Terrorism' from 1970–2007 from the Social Science Citation Index.


Figure 2.   Articles on 'Terrorism' in selected British newpapers 1950–2007.

based at the RAND Corporation, a US think-tank that has maintained strong links to the US government and the corporate sector since its founding. The political scientist Paul Wilkinson became affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Conflict, an intelligence connected think-tank set up by anticommunist crusader Brian Crozier to monitor 'revolutionary

conflict' and 'survey terrorist activities' (*The Guardian* 1970). Yonah Alexander and Walter Laqueur were both affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, which like the Institute for the Study of Conflict had strong links to the intelligence services and was funded by the conservative billionaire Richard Mellon Scaife. Ariel Merari, an Israeli academic, set up the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University in 1979, headed by a former chief of Israeli intelligence (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989, p. 166).

These early experts tended to be ideologically conservative, focusing on violence committed by non-state groups against Western governments and businesses (George 1991, McEvoy and Gormally 1997). This political bias is reflected in their definitions and methodologies, as well as their choice of case studies. At the most crude, this bias was seen in 'actor-based typologies', where the identity of the actor rather than the act itself defines the designation of 'terrorism'. Brian Crozier, for example, characterised violence by non-state actors as 'terrorism' and violence by states as 'counterterrorism' (Schmid *et al.* 2005, pp. 43–44). In other cases, the reality of state-terrorism is acknowledged at an early stage, but given little or no further consideration, as is the case with Paul Wilkinson and Walter Laquer (Jackson 2008). The bias was also reflected less explicitly in the research methodology of the seminal terrorism database developed by Brian Jenkins at RAND (Burnett and Whyte 2005). The continuities with the past remain in the world of the contemporary terror expert. As the journalist Kevin Toolis has noted, 'throughout academia, the study of terrorism is booming. But in reality . . . these "experts" represent an ideology that has its roots in the cold war and in Israeli conservatism' (Toolis 2004, p. 26).

The 'Invisible College'

The early experts created an 'invisible college' of terrorism expertise, described by researchers such as Reid who has done more than any other to introduce the term to studies of terrorism expertise (Schmid *et al.* 2005, Reid 1983, 1993, Reid and Chen 2007). The term has even been used by orthodox authors such as Alex Schmid (Schmid *et al.* 2005, p. 185).

The term 'invisible college' originates in the sociology of science. Although he did not coin it, Derek de Solla Price first developed it in the early 1960s to describe informal communication networks of scientists who come to form an elite and to dominate a field (Price 1963). Price noted that elite scholars come to form an 'in-group' of around 100 people and that:

> For each group there exists a sort of commuting circuit of institutions, research centers, and summer schools giving them an opportunity to meet piecemeal, so that over an interval of a few years everybody who is anybody has worked with everybody else in the same category. (Price 1986, pp. 74–76)

In extensive work on the invisible college of terrorism experts, Reid (and latterly Chen) have noted that the terror experts met the definition of an invisible college because they 'communicated informally, convened periodic terrorism meetings, developed terrorism incident databases . . . shared ideas, and secured funding' (Reid and Chen 2007, p. 43).

It is important to note that Price did not conceive of the invisible college as a 'power group' and in fact saw them as an elite resulting from an 'expectable inequality', which 'automatically reinforce their exclusiveness only by their excellence' (Price 1971, p. 74). In our view, this rather sanguine view is certainly mistaken in the case of terror experts. As Reid (1997) notes:

> In terrorism research, the influence of knowledge producers is severely skewed by the limited types of data used: the invisible college's publications, government documents and media coverage. Thus, development of knowledge in terrorism research has resulted in . . . political bias and policy-oriented studies. (p. 101)

However, Price is correct to note that the hierarchical status of the experts is accomplished in part by 'the overpowering effect of their contribution relative to that of the rest' (Price 1971, p. 74). This can be seen in the terrorism field where the control and arbitration of access to the field and to the in-group is tightly organised around a small number of journals (Burnett and Whyte 2005, Raphael 2008, Reid and Chen 2007).

But the in-group is not simply a network that whilst politically or ideologically biased exists either in parallel with, or apart from, other structures of power. Both counterinsurgency theoryst and 'terrorism studies' have a shared history of intertwined relations with the military, the government and the arms industry. These kinds of connections were famously called the 'military–industrial complex' by President Dwight Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address (Eisenhower 1961). Later, in the 1960s, Senator William Fulbright spoke out against the military influence on academia, warning that, 'in lending itself too much to the purposes of government, a university fails its higher purposes' (cited in Turse 2004). He also called attention to the existence of a 'military–industrial–academic complex' (Fulbright 1970).

This directs our attention to the ideological and practical role of terror experts in reproducing power relations, as opposed simply to studying and writing about terrorism in a political and social vacuum. Our argument in this article conceives of the official nexus of terror experts as performing useful services for other elements of the 'power elite', to use the phrase coined by the sociologist C. Wright Mills (Mills 1956). Thus, we are interested not just in the network of experts, but the way in which they operate in wider networks of power.

We are interested, in other words, in 'embedded expertise' to use the phrase recently adopted by critical authors (Burnett and Whyte 2005). Embedded expertise implies both a network of knowledge and integration with other powerful institutions, including policing, the military, intelligence agencies, the arms and security industry, and last but not least, the media industries. It also implies a conception of orthodox terrorism expertise as part of hegemonic processes, meaning specifically, those which contribute to the reproduction of the 'common sense' consensus of policy and other elite fora (including the mainstream media) (Miller 2001). To be more explicit about this, we are also saying that the contribution that orthodox terror expertise makes is a matter of information management. This puts us squarely on the territory of the discussion of propaganda in Western nations. Noam Chomsky has put this in his characteristically straightforward way. In 'democratic societies', he notes, 'the state is much more limited in its capacity to control behavior by force' than in 'totalitarian' societies:

> Since the voice of the people is allowed to speak out, those in power better control what that voice says – in other words, control what people think. One of the ways to do this is to create political debate that appears to embrace many opinions, but actually stays within very narrow margins. (Chomsky 1987)

While it may be hard for some to accept this characterisation, we are trying here to outline the kind of territory of discussion that is necessary if we are to take the field of terror expertise and the study of the state seriously. In this article, we emphasise just one such arena, that of the mainstream news media.

The most important experts

The first stage in the research was the compilation of a 'bulk' list of terrorism experts from various sources including academia, the Internet, publishing, the mainstream media and the policy world. To identify academic experts we searched the Social Science Citation Index for the keyword 'terrorism' between 1970 and 2007. We included in the study the 132 authors who had written 5 or more articles. Using the SSCI Citation Report function, we complied a list of the authors of the 105 most cited articles (written by 262 unique authors). We included the 99 individuals who were the most cited. In total, these two searches yielded 212 academics who were added to our 'bulk' list. In total this list included 437 terrorism experts.[4] Our subsequent searches determined whether any of these people were in fact influential in any selected arena, such as, in the case of this paper, the mainstream press.

Our primary interest is which experts the media regularly consulted and so we used the 'bulk' list to compile a list of the most prominent terrorism experts in major English language print media.[5] We then compiled biographical information on the 100 experts most prominent in the press in order to draw some conclusions about the typical affiliations of these experts. We made the following findings, which are shown in Table 1.

The experts' networks

A significant number of the experts (42 out of 100) are currently or have previously been a member of state institutions such as government, security or intelligence services, policing or the military. The majority of the experts (67 of the 100) are currently or have previously been members of private think-tanks or research institutes. Of the remaining experts, 16 out of 33 are currently or have previously worked in private security or intelligence firms, or alternatively state institutions such as government, security or intelligence, policing or military service (Table 1).

Of the remaining 17 'independent' experts, four were journalists and 13 were current or former academics with no such affiliation. The 13 academics include the prominent critic of Western foreign policy Noam Chomsky, as well as supporters of state and corporate power such as Francis Fukuyama and Alan Dershowitz.[6] Overall, only 30 of the most prominent 100 were 'independent' of state or private think-tanks or direct corporate funding. This is a potential problem of conflict of interest. A number of studies have shown that the likelihood of independent advice and expertise declines when 'experts' work directly for or even are funded by private interests (Giles 2005, Jorgensen *et al.* 2006, Kassirer 2005, Lesser *et al.* 2007, Yank *et al.* 2007).

Over half of the experts (53 out of 100) are currently or have previously held tenure at an institution of higher education. Only 20 of those were included in the study because of their academic record (i.e. because they were amongst the most prolific or most cited academics in the sample). Out of our 100 top experts from the Major World Media, 19 appeared in our list of the 132 most prolific scholars on the subject. Only six of our top 100 media experts appeared in our list of the 98 most cited scholars (namely Robert Pape, Tara O'Toole, Alan Krueger, Jack Goldsmith, Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman). In some cases, the gap between academic citation and media sourcing is quite striking. Rohan Gunaratna, for example, was found to be the most highly featured of our experts in the media, yet he does not appear at all in either list of scholars. Thirty-three of our 100 top experts have held tenure at academic institutions, but did not appear in either list of scholars. This suggests perhaps that the prestige associated with higher education can provide access to the media even without

Table 1.   References to terror experts in global English language press reports between 2000 and 2007.

Number	Expert	Number of items	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	Rohan Gunaratna	1009	×		×		×	
2	Noam Chomsky	788	×					
3	Sidney Jones	610					×	
4	Clive Williams	588	×			×	×	
5	Francis Fukuyama	503	×					
6	Daniel Pipes	486					×	
7	Paul Wilkinson	472	×			×	×	
8	Jason Burke	464						×
9	Avi Dichter	453			×	×	×	
10	Anthony Cordesman	431	×		×		×	
11	Alan Dershowitz	376	×					
12	Bruce Hoffman	369	×				×	
13	Peter Bergen	357					×	×
14	Robert Baer	335				×		
15	Arnaud de Borchgrave	322				×	×	×
16	Michael Clarke	311	×				×	
17	Jonathan Evans	311				×		
18	Magnus Ranstorp	310		×			×	
19	Irwin Cotler	293	×		×		×	
20	Daniel Benjamin	275			×		×	×
21	Michael Scheuer	268				×	×	
22	Zachary Abuza	267	×				×	
23	David Capitanchik	256	×					
24	John Thompson	238				×	×	
25	Simon Reeve	234						×
26	Wesley Wark	230	×					
27	Frances Townsend	225			×			
28	David Charters	222	×					
29	Kevin Toolis	216						×
30	Tariq Ramadan	204	×				×	
31	Steve Emerson	203					×	×
32	Steve Simon	201	×				×	
33	Paul Beaver	186		×		×	×	×
34	Larry Johnson	184		×	×	×		
35	Brian Jenkins	171		×		×		
36	Rita Katz	157				×	×	
37	David Wright-Neville	154	×		×	×		
38	Olivier Roy	152	×				×	
39	Michael Ledeen	149				×	×	
40	Robert Pape	149	×					
41	Lawrence Eagleburger	144			×		×	
42	Boaz Ganor	144	×			×	×	
43	Paul Rogers	142	×				×	
44	Mike Yardley	142				×		×
45	Fouad Ajami	136	×				×	
46	Paul Pillar	135	×			×	×	
47	Conor Cruise O'Brien	134			×			×
48	Jessica Stern	129	×				×	
49	Patrick Clawson	126					×	
50	Graham Allison	124	×		×			
51	Michael Osterholm	122			×		×	
52	Peter Power	119		×	×			

(*Continued*)

Table 1. (*Continued*).

Number	Expert	Number of items	A	B	C	D	E	F
53	John O'Connor	115			×			
54	Matthew Levitt	104	×		×		×	
55	Michael McKinley	96	×					
56	Mustafa Alani	94					×	
57	Stephen Schwartz	91					×	×
58	Louise Richardson	90	×					
59	Evan Kohlmann	89					×	
60	Anthony Glees	86	×					
61	Laurie Mylroie	85	×				×	
62	Bruce Riedel	85				×	×	
63	Nick Kaldas	80			×			
64	John Sifton	79					×	
65	Jeane Kirkpatrick	78	×		×		×	
66	Neil Doyle	77						×
67	Donald Henderson	74	×					
68	Jonathan Stevenson	74	×				×	×
69	Irwin Redlener	71	×				×	
70	Charles Pena	65					×	
71	Dan Plesch	65	×	×			×	
72	Tara O'Toole	64	×		×		×	
73	Michael Walzer	64	×				×	
74	Daniel Byman	63	×		×		×	
75	Walter Laqueur	62	×				×	
76	Adam Roberts	60	×				×	
77	Marc Sageman	59	×			×	×	
78	Jusuf Wanandi	59	×				×	
79	Athol Yates	59					×	
80	Crispin Black	58		×		×		
81	Rachel Ehrenfeld	58					×	
82	Andrew Lynch	58	×					
83	Rolf Tophoven	56					×	×
84	Alan Krueger	55	×				×	
85	Roger Cressey	53		×	×		×	
86	Jack Goldsmith	52	×		×		×	
87	Alex Standish	52		×				×
88	Cass Sunstein	52	×		×		×	
89	Charles Shoebridge	51		×	×	×		
90	Scott Atran	50	×				×	
91	Seth Jones	50					×	
92	Yonah Alexander	49	×				×	
93	David Claridge	49		×			×	
94	Fred Halliday	49	×				×	
95	David Kilcullen	48				×	×	
96	Kevin Rosser	45		×				
97	Ariel Merari	43	×				×	
98	Carl Ungerer	43	×				×	
99	Bruce Ackerman	42	×					
100	Michael Chandler	40				×	×	

relevant expertise. It is perhaps as noteworthy that some of the key figures in the 'inner core' of terrorism experts did not feature in our longer list of the 262 writers who had authored or co-authored the 105 most cited articles over the past 30 years. Amongst those not included were leading 'core' figures such as Paul Wilkinson and Bruce Hoffman.[7]

The experts' ideological framework

We were interested to analyse to what extent these 100 media experts did or did not challenge the state narrative of the 'war on terror' which dominates policy discourse in Western nations.[8] We consider the dominant state narrative as the idea that the United States and its allies are at war with a global organisation called 'al-Qaeda', which along with affiliated groups is waging an essentially apolitical war against 'Western values' or the Western 'way of life'. In this narrative, the 'terrorists' are irrational – being motivated by hatred and religious dogmatism – implacable and unscrupulous. Given the nature and scale of the threat, the 'terrorists' must be met with aggressive military action abroad and repressive policies at home. We divided the experts into three broad categories based on the extent to which they challenged this narrative.[9]

- Category A: Orthodox experts. They tend not to challenge any aspect of the above narrative. We included in this category experts who might criticise specific decisions in the 'war on terror' but nevertheless do not challenge any aspect of the narrative. For example, we consider some individuals who have criticised the Iraq War as a distraction or as counterproductive, as fitting into this category (e.g. Benjamin, Simon).
- Category B: Alternative experts. They are known for challenging at least part of the above narrative. They might question the existence of a coherent organisation called 'al-Qaeda' (e.g. Burke), or suggest an alternative understanding of the causes of 'terrorism' such as injustice or poverty (e.g. Krueger, McKinley). They might seek to portray 'terrorists' as rational actors motivated by political grievances (e.g. Pape), or warn against aggressive military action (e.g. Peña, Reeve) or the curtailment of civil liberties (e.g. Wright-Neville, Lynch).
- Category C: Critical experts. They tend to reject the above narrative altogether, instead presenting a critical analysis of Western state policy. They might suggest alternative motives of Western states based on economic and geopolitical ambitions rather than safety and security.

We considered 73 of the top 100 experts to be in Category A, 26 in Category B, and only one in Category C. The dominance of orthodox experts over alternative experts is more pronounced if you consider the total number of appearances by Category A, and Category B experts in the study. In percentage terms, appearances by Category A experts made up approximately 77% of the total, with Categories B and C making up approximately 19% and 4%, respectively.[10]

In the data we have presented, we have shown the typical professional background of terrorism experts appearing in the media – in other words, the social and political context in which such expertise is developed – as well as the ideological framework within which such expert knowledge is communicated.

It is perhaps worth outlining briefly why we consider professional background relevant and why we did not focus exclusively on the experts' views and writings. We consider such background crucial because expertise on 'terrorism' are developed within institutions (such as the police, the security services, private corporations and so on) which are neither neutral nor impartial on the question of how political violence is defined or framed. On the contrary, expertise is developed within institutions that are often parties to such violent conflicts and are themselves implicated in forms of political violence (whether it can be legitimately defined as 'terrorism' or not); not to mention involved in forms of propaganda that seek to define such conflicts in a manner favourable to their interests. Obviously, these

institutions are likely to encourage within them ideological assumptions that are favourable to their own interests. Though the numbers are too small to draw any confident conclusions, our data would seem to confirm this. Of the 26 'alternative' experts in Category B, seven (or 27%) had a background working for state institutions and two (or 8%) were found to have worked in private security/intelligence firms. The proportion with such backgrounds was much higher amongst the 'orthodox' experts. Of the experts in Category A, 35 (or 48%) had experience working for state institutions and ten (or 14%) were found to have worked in private security/intelligence firms.

Because Noam Chomsky appeared to be somewhat of an anomaly (being the only Category C expert in the list and appearing in the top ten) we examined his appearances more closely, focusing on the articles returned in the last year of our 7-year sample.

None of those articles included any consideration of Chomsky's views on terrorism or political violence, and the great majority of them mentioned him only in passing. He was directly quoted in only six articles.[11] Many of the articles also included extremely critical comments. Articles accused him, for example, of 'infantile solipsism and self-hating nihilism', of 'convoluted yammering about foreign policy', (Marsden 2007) and 'flights to a separate reality' (Rauch 2007). By way of contrast, Alan Dershowitz, despite having controversially advocated the use of torture, barely received any criticism in the same sample.

Returning to the data on media prominence, we can see that the mainstream print media predominantly feature orthodox experts and are thus overwhelmingly hostile to the 'terrorists'. This is plain from our work on the terror experts as well as from most serious analysis of the production processes, media content and political economy of the news media. This is so in both broadly critical accounts (Andersen 1988, Elliot *et al.* 1983, Herman and Chomsky 1988, Miller 1994), as well as in pluralist and liberal accounts of media processes (Altheide 1987, 2006, Hallin 1983, Moeller 2009). This is not to say that the media do not perform the function of drawing attention to the existence of a 'terrorist group' or of the fact of the problem of which the group is the symptom (Miller 1994), but that the coverage is systematically unbalanced. It is difficult to find any recognition of this point in the work of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism writers.

Furthermore, the overwhelming domination of terror experts whose ideological lineage, academic approach, connections and practice is firmly within the orbit of the military–industrial–academic complex speaks volumes. We are not merely drawing a distinction between oppositional 'experts', on the one hand, and the 'mainstream' terror experts, on the other. We are asserting a stronger point which is that even the alternative analysts within the mainstream – those critical of some element of the official worldview or basing their analysis on empirical evidence – are given less prominence than those adhering to orthodox perspectives.

Comparing the findings

It can be noted that the findings, though supportive in many respects, do differ in one respect from those of Reid and Chen (2007). They found Paul Wilkinson to be the most cited scholar, whilst Brian Jenkins, Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander were all ranked in the top ten. In our study, these four authors, whilst prominent in the media and indeed prolific authors on the subject, were not found to be amongst the most cited academics. Our list of the 262 scholars whose 104 articles were each cited 16 times or more did not include any of those aforementioned four key terrorologists. In fact, only three of Reid and Chen's 42 most cited experts appeared in our list (namely Martha Crenshaw, Arthur Friedlander and David Rapoport).

These differences can be explained by different methodological approaches. Reid and Chen's findings were based on an initial list of 131 researchers compiled from several sources including a previous study by Reid (1997) and a book on the field by the terrorologist Alex Schmid (Schmid and Jongman 1988). In using these sources as a starting point, we believe that the study narrowed the field of inquiry, exaggerating the importance of the terrorologists. Whilst Reid and Chen's initial list of 131 experts was compiled – at least in part – from sources within the terrorology field, our list of 212 academics was based on the more objective criteria of output and citation analysis.

Reid and Chen's study also lacks much critical analysis. Whilst core researchers and key centres of knowledge creation are convincingly identified (notably St Andrews and the RAND Corporation), little critical attention is given to how the institutional affiliations of the core researchers may affect their ideological assumptions.

Case studies of four 'experts'

The analysis of the top 100 most prominent 'experts' provides a clear picture of the tendency of such experts to be linked to parts of the 'military–industrial–academic complex'. We have also shown that their views coincide with the values and policies pursued by the military–industrial complex to a significant degree. This is no minor point. It is clear that to be regarded as a terror expert it is important though not essential to be close to the institutions of the state, the military and associated industrial interests. But our data does not show which way round the influences run. Is it the centres of power in the military–industrial complex that drives the activities and ideas of the terror experts or the other way around? Do the experts in other words make any difference to the operations of power? To explore this we need to examine the extent to which the terror experts are part of a network including other experts, academic and private institutions and think-tanks, state institutions and corporate entities. We have chosen four experts to profile here. We selected three experts who are very widely cited in the news media (all of them being amongst the top twelve in terms of citations in our sample), together with one outlier to illustrate the similar but not identical paths to prominence of a new breed of 'expert' since 11 September 2001.

We chose terror experts who have some university affiliation but who are also very well networked with private and state agencies. It is important that we focus on the academic component of the network because they have more credibility than those whose expertise are based in experience, or is in effect paid advocacy (as in many of the think-tanks). Thus, we did not select Noam Chomsky (number 2, not at the core of the network and very much a lone critical voice), Sidney Jones, Daniel Pipes, Jason Burke, Avi Dichter (numbers 3, 6, 8, and 9, respectively, who do not have academic tenure). We also choose not to focus on Clive Williams (number 4), Francis Fukuyama (number 5), Anthony Cordesman (number 10) or Alan Dershowitz (number 11), on the grounds that Williams is a former intelligence officer, Fukuyama and Dershowitz are not primarily known for their work on terrorism, and Cordesman, though well connected, is no longer at an academic institution but at a think-tank. We selected Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Wilkinson and Bruce Hoffman (numbers 1, 7 and 12) as academics that are also at the centre of the terror expert network and are amongst the most reputable. Our findings on the connections and on the quality of some of the work of these experts is a cautionary tale for those seeking to rely on the information and knowledge supplied by the most credible media experts on terrorism. We also chose Evan Kohlman who does not have academic tenure and is, as we shall see, a representative of the more overtly propagandistic elements of the nexus of interests.

Although some 27% of the 100 terror experts with the most press prominence were either alternative or critical in our terms, we excluded them for our current purposes as we want to show how the core of the network coheres.

The aim here is not to outline the ideas and views of the experts and subject them to critique, nor to produce an analysis of their impact on the media or on public opinion. Rather, we want to demonstrate how some of the key most prominent experts in global English language press are actually part of an invisible college of interconnected public terror experts whose views are strikingly similar and whose activities are linked to state and corporate priorities. The case studies were compiled using publicly available biographical data in the standard way of Power Structure Research (Domhoff 2007). We have also utilised investigative research techniques to unearth obscure data and hidden information (Northmore 1996).

Paul Wilkinson

The British academic Paul Wilkinson was found to be the seventh most prominent terrorism expert in the major print media. He was also second in our list of most prolific authors of scholarly articles. Wilkinson does not, however, appear in our list of most cited scholars, meaning that no article of his has been cited 16 times or more. Wilkinson has been an influential figure in the policy world, and has also been an important figure in promoting terrorism studies and expanding the field.[12]

Wilkinson wrote his first book on terrorism, *Political Terrorism*, in 1974 (Wilkinson 1974) whilst at the University of Wales. His colleague Alex Schmid later recalled how one chapter addressed the issue of '"Terror against liberal democracies" – a theme that would occupy [Wilkinson] for the rest of his life' (Schmid 2008). The theme was developed more explicitly in Wilkinson's *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1977, p. 3), which would be revised and republished in the 1980s and 1990s. Reviewing the book on its original release, *The Economist* (1977) wrote:

> [One] main concern of the book, as the title suggests, is to persuade liberals to take up tougher weapons in defence of their system. Mr Wilkinson, in the most interesting chapter of his book, believes that terrorism in Ulster could have been defeated if the government had gone on with the policy of internment, thorough intelligence gathering and freedom for the army to shoot as it saw fit and on sight.

In 1979, Wilkinson moved to Aberdeen University. He became a regular contributor on ITV and CBS. From 1982 to 1985, he was also a board member of the Independent Broadcasting Authority's Scottish Advisory Committee. In late 1986, he founded the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism, a corporate-funded 'charity' that shared an office and telephone number with the right-wing propaganda group Aims of Industry (Leonard 1988, Miller and Dinan 2008, pp. 59–62). The Foundation's co-founder was Michael Ivens, Director of Aims of Industry, who was best known for his anti-trades union activities. Seeking funding, Wilkinson wrote to major corporations to ask for donations (Leonard 1988).

In 1989, Wilkinson left Aberdeen to join the University of St Andrews as Professor of International Relations. In December that year he became a Director of the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (Debrett's 2007), a new think-tank that was formed by amalgamating the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism with the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC) (Greaves 1989). The Institute for the Study of Conflict was set up by Brian Crozier in 1970, backed by US and British intelligence, with

funding from BP and Shell (*The Times* 1970). It was known particularly for its campaign against allegedly leftwing academics. This was described by one of its targets, the sociologist Robert Young, as 'the closest British academic life got to a McCarthy-ite witch-hunt of radicals' (Young 2005). The ISC also published material on terrorism and counterinsurgency. Wilkinson was connected to the ISC since the beginning of his academic career. His first book, *Social Movement* (1971), was a textbook in a series edited by ISC co-founder Leonard Schapiro. Wilkinson wrote an issue of the Institute's journal titled *Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy* (1976), which clearly formed the basis for his best known work *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1977). According to documents lodged at Companies House in the UK, Wilkinson was actually a Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict briefly, though this seems not to be widely known. It places Wilkinson as at best an unwitting party to a covertly funded intelligence propaganda operation.[13]

In 1994 Wilkinson founded the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at St Andrews. At CSTPV Wilkinson exerted a clear influence on policy-makers. In 1996, he advised Lord Lloyd of Berwick on his investigation into the UK's anti-terrorism legislation and even authored the second part of the report.[14] The Lloyd Report concluded that there was 'a continuing need for permanent United Kingdom-wide legislation', and was the beginning of a legislative process which led to the Terrorism Act 2000. Wilkinson was also in contact with Lord Carlile, appointed as the independent reviewer of the Terrorism Act 2000. Carlile called Wilkinson 'the greatest non-lawyer expert in this country . . . on terrorist organisations around the world' (Hansard 2005).

After 11 September 2001, Wilkinson appeared as an expert witness before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, the Select Committee on Defence, the European Union Select Committee, and the Transport Committee.

Bruce Hoffman

Bruce Hoffman is an American terrorism expert and was the other key figure involved in establishing the CSTPV at St Andrews University. He was found to be the twelfth most prominent terrorism expert in the major print media and 30th in terms of numbers of academic articles.[15] Hoffman does not, however, appear in the full list of most cited scholars.

Hoffman joined the RAND Corporation as an intern in the early 1980s whilst studying for a PhD at Oxford University. He steadily worked his way up the RAND hierarchy and in 1989 took over its Terrorism Chronology Database. RAND had already developed a relationship with Paul Wilkinson several years earlier when Wilkinson started developing his own terrorism database at Aberdeen. This interaction eventually led to the creation of CSTPV, which for a time combined the two databases. Hoffman and Wilkinson founded the Centre together. Hoffman became the Director and Wilkinson the Chairman.

After five years at St Andrews, Hoffman returned to RAND and several years later was seconded again, this time to Iraq where he advised the United States and Britain on their counterinsurgency efforts and argued that the occupation strategy 'would be successful only if it adopts a British model of counter-insurgency' (Burnett and Whyte 2005, p. 11). Hoffman had compared American policy with its British imperial predecessor in his early writings (Hoffman 1983, 1984).

On 12 July 2006 it was announced that Hoffman would join Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he is currently Professor in the Security Studies Program. Georgetown has been an important hub of terrorism expertise for years. The Edmund A. Walsh School is named after a hard-line anticommunist described

by his biographer as a 'proponent of American exceptionalism' (McNamara 2005, p. xv). The School produced the Center for Strategic and International Studies with its host of affiliated terrorism experts in the 1980s. Herman and O'Sullivan (1989) identified it as the 'most important' terrorism institute (p. 81).

Rohan Gunaratna

Rohan Gunaratna is a Singapore-based terrorism expert, originally from Sri Lanka. He was found to be the most prominent terrorism expert in the study.[16] Gunaratna was a low-level government official in Sri Lanka during the 1980s when he visited the United States as part of the State Department International Visitor Program where he used a computer for the first time and met Stephen Cohen ('a brilliant guy', according to Gunaratna) (Whisenhunt 2003). Cohen is now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Five years later when Cohen was appointed head of the Office of Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois, Gunaratna was employed there. Gunaratna subsequently undertook study in the United States at the University of Maryland and Notre Dame University, and at the latter he 'got to know' Bruce Hoffman (Hughes 2003). In 1996, the UK Foreign Office awarded Gunaratna a scholarship and he started a PhD at the University of St Andrews under Hoffman's supervision. In 1997, he began writing articles for *Jane's Intelligence Review*. After completing his PhD, he joined the CSTPV.

Throughout this period Gunaratna had focused on the Tamil Tigers, but shortly before the World Trade Centre attacks he had turned his attention to al-Qaeda. He published *Inside Al Qaeda* (2004) shortly afterwards and became a prolific media commentator.

In *Inside Al Qaeda*, Gunaratna described himself as having been, 'principal investigator of the United Nations' Terrorism Prevention Branch'. After the Australian *Sunday Age* made checks on his biographical details, Gunaratna admitted that there was no such position as principal investigator at the Terrorism Prevention Branch and that he had worked there as a research consultant (Hughes 2003). Gunaratna also retracted his claim that he 'was called to address the United Nations, the US Congress and the Australian Parliament in the wake of September 11, 2001', confirming that he had in fact spoken at a seminar organised by the parliamentary library and given evidence to a US congressional hearing (Hughes 2003).

Although Gunaratna was found to be the most prominent academic in our study, he did not appear in our lists of the 132 most prolific or the 99 most cited scholars, showing that he has yet to make as sizeable an impression on the academic community as he has on the media. Gunaratna's academic work, though, has come in for criticism. For example, Michael K. Connors (2006) has provided an extended critique of Gunaratna's book on *Conflict and terrorism in Southern Thailand* (2005), suggesting that it has 'poorly founded conclusions' (p. 151). Connors goes on to suggest that the book reads more like a 'police dossier' than a 'credible historical record' (p. 163), while others have pointed to Gunaratna's uncritical reliance on official sources (Hamilton-Hart 2005).

Despite the evidence of exaggerated credentials, and unsubstantiated claims, Gunaratna still enjoys powerful connections. Following in the footsteps of his mentors, Gunaratna established the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. Bruce Hoffman and a host of other Western terrorism experts are listed as members, including a number of former intelligence, military, and other state personnel such as the former head of MI6 Richard Dearlove, the former Israeli government counterterrorism coordinator Boaz Ganor, the former Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police David Veness, and former US Special Forces Brigadier General Russell Howard (ICPVTR 2008).

Evan Kohlmann

Evan Kohlmann was found to be the 59th most prominent terrorism expert in the major print media.[17] Whilst studying for a degree in International Relations at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (where Bruce Hoffman would later be appointed a professor), Kohlmann took an internship at the Investigative Project for Terrorism (IPT), a private research group set up in 1995 by the journalist Steve Emerson (the 31st most prominent expert in our list). Emerson campaigns against what he sees as radical Islam and is funded by the same American foundations that support the vast array of pro-Israel groups. In 2006, for example, IPT received US$5000 from the Bialkin Family Foundation, and US$10 000 from The Ellen and Gary Davis Foundation. In the same year, The Ellen and Gary Davis Foundation also donated US$5000 to Israel at Heart and US$1000 to Friends of the IDF (Internal Revenue Service 2006).

Kohlmann's role at IPT was the monitoring of websites, supposedly to collect intelligence information on terrorists. He briefly left terrorism research and enrolled in law school but after 11 September 2001 returned to the Investigative Project and started work on a book exploring the activities of al-Qaeda in Europe. He wrote regular articles for the conservative *National Review*, and the pseudo-academic *Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International*.

In 2004, he graduated from law school and set up a website Globalterroralert.com, which he ran out of his bedroom (National Public Radio 2006). The website posted extracts from videos and chat forums from 'extremist' websites. Later that year he was recruited as a media analyst for MSNBC. Despite his lack of credentials, Kohlmann has worked for the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Australian Federal Police, the Crown Prosecution Service, and Scotland Yard (GlobalTerroralert.com 2008). He has appeared frequently as an expert witness for the prosecution in cases against Muslims in the United States, the UK and elsewhere. Many of these cases are based on charges of conspiracy or supporting a terrorist organisation, where the individual's guilt is established by association. In some cases, there is no evidence of links to terrorism at all and the defendants have been charged purely in relation to materials in their position, such as literature on weapons or explosives, or merely videos and written material downloaded from the Internet. In Britain he testified against Samina Malik, the young woman convicted of writing poems which 'glorified terrorism'; Younis Tsouli, who although the Judge admitted 'came no closer to a bomb or a firearm than a computer keyboard' (Oliver and Agencies 2007), was sentenced to 24 years; and Mohammed Atif Siddique, a young Scottish Muslim charged in relation to downloaded material.

Kohlmann's focus on the Internet means that he has a very limited knowledge and understanding of the political and historical context of the groups he studies. He dismisses 'social causes' and says he tries 'to avoid learning about what the defendants may have done that's irrelevant to [his] testimony' (Bartosiewicz 2008). In *United States v. Aref and Hossain* (2006), Kohlmann testified as an expert on Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, standing in for the prosecution's preferred expert Rohan Gunaratna. He was cross-examined on his knowledge of Bangladesh by defence attorney Kevin Luibrand. He knew neither the name of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh then or in 2003, nor the name of the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami then or in 2003. He admitted he had never been to Bangladesh, and he could not name any political parties in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, Kohlmann was permitted to testify.

Kohlmann is currently affiliated with two terrorism research groups, the NEFA Foundation, and Counterterrorism Blog. The NEFA Foundation was set up by the Washington

Group, a lobbying firm and a subsidiary of the PR giant Ketchum, which is in turn part of the Omnicom group one of the big four global communications conglomerates (Miller and Dinan 2003). The Counterterrorism Blog was set up by Andrew Cochran, a former adviser to Ronald Reagan turned lobbyist, whose clients have included Steven Emerson. He said he had 'endeavored to build a consulting practice . . . which would support the interests of the private sector in the Global War on Terror' (Cochran 2007).

The Terror Expert network

As can be seen from the detail in the case studies, the terror experts we have focused on are not by and large operating as individuals but in a number of overlapping networks. To show how a part of one of these networks connects, we have presented the connections in Figure 3. This shows that the four experts we have focused on are connected in a number of ways. At the centre of this network are the leading UK and US terrorologists, Bruce Hoffman and Paul Wilkinson, along with other central figures such as Brian Jenkins (number 35 in our list). Jenkins was one of the earliest terrorologists and, according to Schmid (2008, p. 1), in the early 1970s was one of 'only a handful of academic researchers who took "terrorism" seriously'. Jenkins set up the RAND terrorism research centre, and later advised President Nixon on terrorism. It was from RAND that Hoffman came to set up the St Andrews centre with Wilkinson. One of their protégés, Gunaratna – whose PhD was supervised by Hoffman – went on to set up the international centre in Singapore and unsurprisingly the advisory council includes Jenkins, Hoffman and a host of other experts and former police military and intelligence officials. One of Gunaratna's advisors is Boaz Ganor, the former counterterrorism coordinator in the Israeli Prime Ministers Office (1993–96). Ganor is the co-founder and Director the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (IICT) based at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, a private university with very strong links with the Israeli military and intelligence agencies. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, it reserves 15% of places for applicants from 'graduates of elite army units . . . who have shown significant leadership potential' (Arnold 1999). In 2008/09, the IDC provided a base for Israeli government propaganda operations seeking to use social networking tools such as Facebook and Twitter to promote the Israeli government line on the attack on Gaza (Griffin 2009).

Those at the core of the network have other connections too, for example through the leading academic journals on terrorism. Gunaratna, Hoffman and Wilkinson are all on the advisory board of the *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*. Gunaratna and Magnus Ranstorp (number 18 in our list, formerly of St Andrews) are on the advisory board of *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* of which Hoffman is the Editor. Meanwhile, the other key terrorism journal, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, is edited from St Andrews by the current Director Alex Schmid and, along with a whole host of other mainstream terror experts, we find Wilkinson, Gunaratna and Hoffman again.

Both latter journals are published by Routledge,[18] part of the Informa Group, which has itself funded the St Andrews centre (a grant of US$300 000) via a lobbying subsidiary, Washington Policy and Analysis, Inc., which works mostly for the oil and gas industry. Gunaratna, Hoffman and Ranstorp (while he was at St Andrews) come together again via their involvement with Risk Management Solutions that provides risk analysis for the oil and insurance industries.

So much for the core of the network. We have also included one 'expert' among our four cases who does not come from the core. Kohlmann has a traditional pedigree in that he studied at Georgetown. But he has had a long association with some of the more obviously

Figure 3.   Terror Expert Network.
Source: Spin Watch.

propagandistic elements of the terror expert community, particularly through Steve Emerson (whose prominence seems only to have suffered temporarily after he claimed that Islamists were behind the Oklahoma City bombing) (Spinprofiles 2009a). Other connections with Zionist groups with Israeli intelligence links include the SITE institute with whose Director, Rita Katz, Kohlmann worked closely. Kohlmann is not directly connected to any of the five academic centres we highlight nor does he have a university affiliation. However, he is indirectly linked to the core through his extended network. In particular, we can note the link with Matthew Levitt a kind of bridging figure who, along with Kohlmann, writes for the obviously partisan Counterterrorism blog, but who also advises the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy West Point, as well as advising Gunaratna's Singapore based institute and the Israeli-based IICT.

Conclusion: on terrorism experts in the media

What does this analysis tell us? First, that the production of academic work and of media coverage of terrorism has exponentially increased since 11 September 2001.

Second, that those most cited in the academic literature are not those most cited in the media. Indeed, many of the experts examined, though they had written widely on terrorism, have not been as prominent as their number or rate of citation of their publications would suggest.

Third, the terror experts that are most prominent in the media are disproportionately linked to corporate and state institutions (as opposed to just being academic experts) and are overwhelmingly signed up to the 'orthodox' view on terrorism. This obviously suggests a strong orientation by the mainstream media towards official definitions and shows definitively that those who argue that the 'terrorists' effectively get their message across are wrong.

Fourth, the core of the network of orthodox experts is strongly connected and has been instrumental in spreading the web of institutes and research centres across the world, where they now form a nexus dominating the world of terrorism expertise, in relation to the mainstream media (as we show here). Other research has shown that this nexus also dominates the terrorism literature. However, our work indicates that though they have a dominant position and are arbiters for access to the main journals, they are not the most highly ranked in terms of either numbers of publications or – most notably – in terms of citations, the measure indicating the extent to which their work is cited across the social sciences. Perhaps this signifies a waning of the centrality of the 'invisible college'. Further analysis of time-series data will answer this question.

Lastly, the findings suggest that any theory that connected the military–industrial complex with academic terrorism institutions and with the mainstream media would not be short of data to substantiate the view that both the mainstream media and the terror experts are well integrated into state and corporate ideological management processes. It is important to recognise, in other words, that the terror experts are not simply expressions of the ideological needs of state and corporate actors, but are actually a functional part of the governing nexus. In this context, the characterisation by James Petras (2004) that although the orthodox experts are mostly 'far from the killing fields' their 'spirit' is 'there, on the front lines and in the torture chambers', does not seem so wide of the mark.

The study of the terror experts also tells us a little about media–source relations – a sub-field of media studies that examines the relations between news professionals and their sources, such as the terror experts. The literature on this approach is a valuable

corrective to those studies of the news media that tend to focus their attention only on media institutions or content (Miller and Dinan 2009). But in our terms, it does not go far enough in examining the wider dimensions of communicative activity undertaken by organisations for which news media are only one part of their activities, such as the terrorism experts.

This article reports the first findings from a larger project. We have focused in particular on the terror experts most prominent in the mainstream Anglophone press without fine-grained analysis of national differences or of editorial differences between elite and mass market or liberal and conservative press. No doubt this kind of analysis will reveal patterns worthy of comment. So too would in-depth analysis of television news. We have factored UK television news into this study (utilising a sample that is much greater than is normally the case in media studies), but we have not gone into the findings here. It should be noted, however, that if anything television news – in the UK and the US at least – is much more constrained than the general global picture of the Anglophone newspapers we discuss here.

Although we do not discuss this in any depth here, it is also evident that the official experts are much less prominent in the academic arena and in those communicative spaces which are more open to popular communicative pressures, such as the internet, and that alternative and oppositional experts seem to be relatively more prominent on the internet than in the mainstream news media.

This point highlights one of the main implications of the findings; that an interest in communications and terrorism should focus not simply on the role of the news media, but on the other myriad communicative practices and spaces through and with which power operates. Second, it shows that studying the media and terror entails a circuit of communication between sources of expertise and information, media institutions, the public and political institutions. Understanding such circuits, how they constitute and re-constitute relations of power and how they solidify into decisions and practices ought to be central to the agenda of critical studies on terrorism.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. The study is ongoing, but there are extensive data already posted on the Internet that give much further detail on our methods and various samples including profiles of several hundred terror experts and terrorism institutes and research centres (see http://www.spinprofiles.org).
2. Table 1 shows data on the number of academic articles on Terrorism published between 1970 and 2007. It was compiled from the Social Science Citation Index. The specific details of the search were: TS=(Terrorism) DocType=All document types; Language=All languages; Database=SSCI; and Timespan=1970-2007.
3. Table 2 shows data on the coverage of terrorism in *The Times* and *The Sunday Times*, and *The Guardian* and *The Observer* between 1950 and 2007. The data were compiled from three fully searchable newspaper archives; The Times Digital Archive (1785–1985), the ProQuest Historical Newspapers archive of *The Guardian* and *The Observer* (1791–2003), and the newspaper database of Lexis Nexis. Each year between 1950 and 2007 was searched for articles including the terms 'Terrorism' OR 'Terrorists'. The data for *The Times* show a decline in coverage in

1979. This is an anomaly due to an industrial dispute which led to the paper's closure between December 1978 and November 1979.

4. For a full account of how this list was compiled, see http://www.spinprofiles.org/index.php/ Terrorexpertise:Methodology/.

5. For a full account of how this list was compiled, see http://www.spinprofiles.org/index.php/ Terrorexpertise:Methodology/.

6. Dershowitz is well known for his defence of Israel and its political and military actions including in Lebanon in 2006 and following September 2001 for his argument that torture is, in certain circumstances, morally acceptable providing it was done within the law. Fukuyama is famous for his essay on the *End of History* on the global triumph of political and economic liberalism. An official in the Reagan administration, he went on to play a significant role in the Project for A New American Century, though he later became disenchanted with the Bush administration and with Neoconservatism. For further details about Dershowitz and Fukuyama, see Spinprofiles (2009c, 2009e).

7. The cut-off point here was all articles cited 16 or more times. This excluded those authors who have not reached that total of citations for any given article. Given that some of these authors have written a significant number of articles, it may be that compiling all their citations would exceed 16 cumulatively. However, in the specific cases of Wilkinson Hoffman and Gunaratna, their cumulative citations between 1970 and 2007 did not reach the threshold of 16 according to the Web of Science.

8. We use the term 'dominant' here to signify both numerically preponderant (where appropriate) and dominant in the sense of a power relation. That is, dominance is a property of power relations. Specifically in relation to the argument here it relates to the power of the state to enforce its own conception in policy discussion and in public debate or to the dominance of certain strands of expert discourse. This can be referred to as a dominant ideology, but not in any reductionist sense as an inevitable expression of class relations. Nor do we accept those versions of the theory that assume that dominant ideology is shared by most people in a society. It may in fact be the case that it is dominant in the sense of ruling, but not in the sense of having a preponderance of adherents (Miller 2001).

9. There is inevitably a degree of subjectivity in assigning experts to categories A or B as it may be the case that some of those categorised as 'A' have on some occasion voiced some criticism of the dominant paradigm.

10. Though Category A has been rounded up to 77% to make up the percentage figures, it should be noted that in fact the calculation fell below the decimal point at 76.4%.

11. We included quotations from texts as well as published op-eds or letters.

12. For more background and sources on Wilkinson and his associates, see Spinprofiles (2009a, 2009b, 2009i, 2009m, 2009o).

13. Wilkinson joined the Council of Management at the Institute for the Study of Conflict on 27 October 1980, resigning on 26 May 1981 (Companies House 1981).

14. *Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism* (CM3420), vol. 2 (Lloyd 1996), authorship credited in Wilkinson's entry in Debrett's (2007).

15. For more background and sources on Hoffman and RAND, see Spinprofiles (2009h, 2009n).

16. For more background and sources on Gunaratna, see Spinprofiles (2009g).

17. For more background and sources on Kohlmann and associates, see Spinprofiles (2009d, 2009f, 2009j, 2009k, 2009l).

18. Which obviously also publishes this journal too.

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